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Abstract
This article analyses the successful Conservative election campaign of 2019 and how it took
advantage of a fractured political and economic landscape. It reviews the unique circum-
stances around the 2019 election and the ‘surprising death’ of a no-deal Brexit. We then anal-
yse the divergent political communication strategies in the 2017 and 2019 Conservative
campaigns showing how the latter was much more coherent and politically unorthodox.
Drawing on socioeconomic, demographic and British Election Study data, we argue that
Boris Johnson’s messaging was carefully tailored towards the demands of voters in the ‘red
wall’ seats. Conservative success was built around an appeal to voters in these economically
depressed ‘geographies of discontent’. But while tremendously successful, the coalition this
created is potentially fragile. An unconventional, ‘leftish’ Conservative campaign built a new,
diverse bloc of voters. It includes a number of left-wingers expecting change alongside tradi-
tional Conservative supporters, and will be hard to keep together given the economic turbu-
lence ahead.
Keywords: Conservative, Labour, politics, general election 2019, British Election Study,
geographies of discontent
Introduction
BRITAIN’S 2019 general election broke the war
of attrition that had existed between the
executive and opposition parties since the
election two years previously. In a country
highly polarised by the Brexit debate, with a
Parliament that had been unable to resolve
the issue decisively in either direction, the
Conservative Party skilfully took advantage
of public weariness. Boris Johnson’s simple
message, ‘Get Brexit Done’, came to encapsu-
late the election itself. In the Lord Ashcroft
election day poll 72 per cent of Conservative
Party voters listed ‘getting Brexit done’ in
the top three reasons for why they backed
the party.1 Public fatigue with Brexit was, of
course, assisted by Brexiters in the parlia-
mentary Conservative Party voting against
Theresa May’s Brexit deal on three separate
occasions in 2019 (15 January, 12 March and
29 March). Nonetheless, this group of pro-
Brexit Conservative MPs made a series of
high-risk moves that ultimately paid off.
Firstly, with Johnson installed as leader they
re-orientated the Conservative Party towards
a harder form of Brexit in exchange for
accepting the special status for Northern Ire-
land, disregarding opposition from the
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) in spite of
the confidence and supply arrangement their
party had previously agreed. Furthermore,
under Johnson, they also carried through a
purge of MPs, achieving a Conservative
Party that was much more closely aligned
with pro-Brexit populism. This was carried
through under the guise of the prorogation
crisis, which was a largely manufactured
showdown between the government and the
British courts. Secondly, they gave greater
emphasis to the idea of a ‘no-deal’ exit and
reframed the ensuing parliamentary opposi-
tion to it as a resistance to Brexit tout court.
Under Johnson’s leadership they were able
to turn a crisis manufactured by their own
gesture towards a supposed no-deal exit into
support for their final Brexit deal with the
EU.
Theresa May’s EU deal became deeply
unpopular with Brexit voters and Conservative
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politicians in 2019. However, during the
2017 general election campaign she had actu-
ally anticipated the opposition that would
later face her. The description she offered of
the parliamentary opposition to Brexit was,
at the time, largely a hypothetical possibility,
rather than a tangible reality. However, it
had significant parallels with how Johnson
would frame the 2019 election. When May
announced her intention to seek a general
election in April 2017 she justified it on the
grounds of parliamentary opposition to
Brexit. Anticipating the ‘people versus Parlia-
ment’ election Johnson would push for in
the autumn of 2019, May argued that ‘the
country is coming together but Westminster
is not’. ‘Our opponents believe because the
government’s majority is so small our
resolve will weaken and we will change
course’, but ‘they underestimate our determi-
nation to get the job done’, she insisted with
words closely resembling Johnson’s 2019 slo-
gan.2 Both May and Johnson sought to use
the Brexit cleavage in British politics to cre-
ate a much wider Conservative electoral
coalition. They were actually both successful.
For while May failed to deliver the landslide
she hoped for, it created the basis for John-
son’s success.
Although May’s campaign is inevitably
recalled negatively, given the loss of the
Conservatives’ parliamentary majority, the
number of votes she won (13,636,684) was
higher than the number Blair received in
1997 (13,518,167) and not far short of John
Major’s postwar record in 1992 (14,093,007).
While Johnson did improve further on May’s
number of votes (13,966,451), more signifi-
cant in Britain’s first past the post electoral
system is the geographical distribution of the
votes across constituencies and direct switch-
ers from Labour. Johnson lost 7 per cent of
Conservative 2017 voters to the Liberal
Democrats and 4 per cent to Labour. But he
crucially made up for this with 11 per cent
of Labour 2017 voters switching directly to
the Tories, concentrated in leave-voting seats
previously held by Labour, some with large
majorities.3 The geographical location of
these voters, combined with Labour’s further
loss of voters to the Liberal Democrats and
other parties, allowed Johnson to break the
so-called ‘red wall’. The new electoral coali-
tion that the Conservatives built is
impossible to disaggregate from the Brexit
vote and the socioeconomic and cultural fac-
tors underlying it. Consequently, the issue of
analysing and explaining the new Conserva-
tive electoral coalition strongly overlaps with
the UK-wide referendum decision to leave
the EU.
This article investigates the new political
divides of England and Wales which were
evident in the 2019 general election. We
argue that both local socioeconomic geogra-
phy and political values played a role in the
Conservative victory. We uncover clear dif-
ferences between local socioeconomic condi-
tions in seats the Conservatives won in 2017
and 2019 and their traditionally held seats.
These findings support the claim that towns
and small cities with low levels of economic
dynamism have been an important factor in
driving support for Brexit and the 2019 Con-
servative election victory. However, focuss-
ing too extensively on these divergences can
be misleading. Small groups of potential
swing voters, concentrated in key constituen-
cies, play a fundamental role in the first past
the post electoral system. Importantly, the
Conservative campaign message was tai-
lored towards winning the support of a rela-
tively small number of Labour voters
prepared to switch. The ‘Get Brexit Done’
slogan appealed to the partisan interests of
these voters in a heavily polarised electoral
climate, which had previously seen signifi-
cant levels of support for a no-deal exit.
The research and analysis presented here
consciously focusses on England and Wales.
The political divides in Scotland are highly
significant for British politics, but also dis-
tinctive to those found south of the border.
They require special, focussed investigation,
which is beyond the scope of this article.
Background to the 2019 general
election, the strange death of ‘no
deal’
Johnson took over the Conservative Party
following the failure of May to pass her deal
through Parliament and in the context of a
surge in support for the Brexit Party. His
election as leader was always very likely
given the strongly eurosceptic nature of the
grassroots membership and his position as
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the highest profile supporter of leave. 4 This
was a political conjuncture that appeared to
show there was no practical form of Brexit
that would satisfy the supporters of Brexit,
either in Parliament or in the electorate. Sup-
port for a no-deal exit from the EU was
remarkably high amongst Conservative
members and voters. The ESRC Party Mem-
bers Project produced polling of Conserva-
tive Party members vis-a-vis voters in
January 2019. We reproduce this polling in
Table 1 to illustrate the political challenge
that May and Johnson faced.
Drawing on this data we can outline three
heuristic groups that Johnson successfully
consolidated in his 2019 coalition. First, the
Brexit hardliners: this group supported ‘no
deal’ and wanted the sharpest possible break
with the EU. In January 2019, they were
around 25 per cent of the public but a strik-
ing 57 per cent of Conservative Party mem-
bers. Second, the Brexit compromisers: this
group was willing to support May’s deal
and, we can reasonably infer, most deals
with the EU. They were 13 per cent of the
public and 23 per cent of Conservative Party
members. Third, out of the remain support-
ers (42 per cent of voters and 23 per cent of
Conservative voters) Johnson had to carve a
further group, remain compromisers, compris-
ing voters who were prepared to accept his
Brexit. Johnson employed a high-risk strat-
egy to balance these groups’ demands,
which paid off. He appealed to the Brexit
hardliners both through the course of the
leadership campaign and upon becoming
PM. To the surprise of many he carried
through on his threat to prorogue Parliament
to avoid parliamentary scrutiny, leading to a
conflict between the government and the
courts.
This had two important effects. First, this
highly performative gesture and populist
language shored up Johnson’s support
amongst Brexit hardliners without ever tak-
ing the country close to an actual no-deal
exit. This was followed up by a purge of
twenty-one Conservative MPs who voted
with the opposition to stop no deal, leading
to the loss of Johnson’s parliamentary major-
ity. Crucially, Johnson did not need to carry
through a no-deal exit to satisfy the hardlin-
ers: he simply needed to appear to push for
one. Secondly, these actions convinced oppo-
sition parties that Johnson was actually seri-
ous about a no-deal exit. On 4 September
2019, and again two days later, they decided
to oppose an early election until such time
as an extension had been secured with the
EU. If they had provided the parliamentary
majority necessary for it, Johnson would
have been forced to campaign electorally on
the basis of a no-deal exit. While John Cur-
tice noted in early September 2019 that polls
at that date put support for no deal at
around 38 per cent, the opposition to it was
still 44 per cent.5 This made a ‘no-deal elec-
tion’ a major political risk.
Once Johnson secured an agreement in
October 2019 the dynamic changed. Pushing
ahead with a deal the DUP opposed was a
high stakes gamble, and Johnson rode his
luck. But his core calculation that he had suf-
ficient standing amongst Brexit supporters to
popularise his deal proved correct. This
changed the subsequent election from a ‘no
deal’ to a ‘deliver the deal’ one. Indeed, it is
revealing that ‘no deal’ disappeared from
post-election polling questions and subse-
quent analyses. There is not, for example, a
single reference to it in the thirty-six page
data-based report on Labour’s defeat put
together by Michael Ashcroft, whereas there
are fifty-nine references to Brexit and four to
‘get Brexit done’.6 Johnson’s implied gesture
towards a no-deal exit allowed him to
appease the Brexit hardliners group. His sub-
sequent shift towards a deal gave the ‘get
Brexit done’ a more tangible and pragmatic
sensibility, appealing to the remain and
Brexit compromisers. Notably, the coalition
Johnson brought together around this slogan
combined voters who were enthusiastic













Source: ESRC Party Members Project
*The others to 100% either don’t know, wouldn’t
vote or refusing to answer
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about Brexit and those who accepted it
should happen. As Table 2 shows, nearly
one in five 2019 Conservative voters in the
election described themselves as having
voted remain but believed the referendum
‘should be honoured’ and ‘we should get on
with it’. This allowed Johnson to augment
his Brexit enthusiast support with a further
layer that reluctantly believed Britain should
leave. This strategy helped Johnson to keep
hold of May’s 2017 voters (85 per cent of
whom stuck with the Conservatives and
expanded the coalition with voters switching
from Labour).
There are two other factors that con-
tributed to this success. First, Jeremy Cor-
byn’s leadership of the Labour Party was
very unpopular, making it easier for remain
compromisers to justify voting Conservative.
Second, Nigel Farage’s Brexit Party stood
down hundreds of candidates, despite for-
mally opposing Johnson’s deal—a decision
that effectively took ‘no deal’ off the table as
an electoral choice for voters.
Comparing Johnson 2019 to May
2017
We investigated the change in Conservative
Party messaging between 2017 and 2019
using content analysis.7 We put together a
summary description of key messages and
points used in eighteen (nine each from the
two campaigns) different speeches and
videos.8 These broke down into six cam-
paign videos and three campaign speeches:
(a) an early campaign speech; (b) their
respective manifesto launches; and (c) their
final campaign speech of the election. In
Table 3, we contrast the two campaign mes-
sages, revealing a clear difference. We can
see that May ran a much more conventional
Conservative Party campaign, focussed on
the idea of stability, strength, and control of
immigration. Johnson adopted a much more
populist repertoire of messages, which
focussed on the failure of Parliament to deli-
ver Brexit and the need for greater invest-
ment to level up left-behind regions in the
UK. Johnson’s messages promised change,
whereas May focussed on protecting the sta-
tus quo (stability) and making the nation
more powerful and better protected
(strength). Johnson’s campaign made a series
of appeals to traditionally Labour voting
leave areas that were repeated relentlessly
throughout the campaign. On the one hand,
a tidal wave of investment would be
unleashed once Brexit was out of the way.
On the other, the government would take
Table 2: Johnson’s coalition of Brexit enthusiasts and Brexit accepters in the electorate
Which of the following statements comes closest













I voted for Britain to leave the EU at the referen-
dum and I now want Brexit to happen as soon as
possible
41 73 13 4
I voted for Britain to leave the EU at the referen-
dum, but now I think we should remain
5 2 9 6
I voted for Britain to remain in the EU at the refer-
endum, but the result to leave the EU must be
honoured and we need to get on with it
13 18 9 9
I voted for Britain to remain in the EU at the refer-
endum and would still like to prevent Brexit from
happening if at all possible
35 4 61 76
I did not vote in the EU referendum 5 3 7 5
Prefer not to say 0 0 1 0
Source: Lord Ashcroft, ‘On the day’ election poll, 13 December 2019
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proactive action to level up the UK with an
‘infrastructure revolution’ and more invest-
ment in education and the NHS.
This led into a key distinction in their
respective economic offers. May and her
team had consciously used the adage there
is ‘no magic money tree’ to criticise Jeremy
Corbyn’s rejection of austerity.9 Johnson
would tack in the opposite direction. He
claimed in one interview to have argued
‘with colleagues in the government’ when
the Tories returned to power that ‘austerity
was just not the right way forward’, and
even made a link between the EU and
increased levels of regional inequality across
the UK.10 On Brexit, their arguments had
some similarities, but the circumstances had
changed and Johnson communicated his case
much more clearly. May justified calling an
election on the basis that Parliament was
likely to oppose her deal. However, at the
time this was a merely hypothetical possibil-
ity. Johnson, by contrast, successfully used
the crisis in Parliament, to which hard Brex-
iters had contributed by opposing May’s
deal, to present his opponents as frustrating
the referendum and holding the country
back.
Johnson’s superior communication used a
linear argument, that is, each stage in the
explanation followed from the previous one.
This was evident from a second piece of con-
tent analysis, which reviewed two short
videos, both around a minute long and
based on a pre-prepared script. Figure 1 pre-
sents this data. A dotted line indicates a
weak logical connection and a continuous
line an argument that follows from the pre-
vious statement. Whereas Johnson’s argu-
ment was linear, May’s was disordered. She
offered a series of pledges, as part of a ‘plan
for a stronger Britain’, which she suggested
was conditional on giving her party the
majority it needed to get a deal with the EU.
However, the pledges were presented as a
list and were not framed as part of a broader
philosophy for governing Britain. Conse-
quently, it was not clear how they followed
from one another or what their underlying
vision and purpose was. In addition to his
superior messaging, Johnson’s argument was
also assisted by the fortune of circumstances.
He faced a public exhausted with the occu-
pation of the news agenda by Brexit. This
allowed him confidently to present his pro-
mise to protect the NHS and raise the cost of
living as an outcome of delivering his deal,
and politics could return to ‘normal’.
Although pre-scripted, it avoided the repeti-
tion of disconnected sound bites and instead
held together as an argument that enthused
voters about the good Brexit could do.
Johnson’s message successfully appealed
to Brexit voters who wanted to see the refer-
endum decision implemented. He largely
manufactured the prorogation crisis of 2019
Table 3: Content analysis of May and Johnson’s campaign messages
Johnson 2019 May 2017




‘Get Brexit done’ x9 ‘Strong and stable’ x6
Levelling up / level up Britain x3 ‘A stronger, fairer x2
Hung parliament / broken more prosperous
parliament / deadlocked Britain’
Parliament / or similar x7 Stronger Britain x2
‘Unleash Britain’s potential’ x3 Strong economy x2
NHS x2 NHS x2
Education x2 Control of borders, x5
‘Tidal wave of investment’ x2 laws, money
20k more police x3 Immigration x2
‘Infrastructure revolution’ / new and
better technology





x1 ‘New trade deals’ x2
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to shore up support from Brexit hardliners
and squeeze the Brexit Party vote, culminat-
ing in its mass withdrawal of candidates. As
such, his approach to constitutional norms
fits closely with the research of Milan W.
Svolik, who has shown that voters who
otherwise support democracy are willing to
accept the violation of norms and rules if
they perceive it as aligning with their parti-
san interests.11 But Johnson also identified
the need to adjust Conservative messaging
on the traditional left/right scale to max-
imise his switchers from Labour. Campaign
messages that promised to ‘level up Britain’,
to ‘unleash Britain’s potential’ and break
with austerity (‘a tidal wave of investment’)
all formed part of an unconventional, ‘leftist’
Tory campaign strategy.
Analysing the fractured politics of
England and Wales
A number of accounts of the contemporary
political landscape have linked adverse local
socioeconomic circumstances (‘geographies
Theresa May: ‘My Plan for A 
Stronger Britain’ 
Whether we move forward together 
depends on geng the Brexit deal right
A deal that takes back control of our 
borders, laws and money and respects the 
will of the Brish people
Disordered / non-linear 
And I’ll deliver on my play 
for a stronger Britain
Break in argument 
New trade deals for  
our goods and services  
The chance to own a home and more 
affordable housing 
A good school place for every child 
Protecon from unfair energy price rises 
LIST O
F PLEDGES 
A more secure and united Britain.  
Vote for me and my team. Let’s move 
forward together
Boris Johnson: ‘Our choice
is very simple’
Our choice is very simple. We can get 
Brexit done, or we can spend another 
groundhog year with another groundhog 
referendum
Where My Corbyn cannot answer the 
fundamental queson: is he for Remain or 
Leave? 
What price would he pay to secure Nicola 
Sturgeon’s support to enter no.10?  
If he can’t answer those quesons tonight
I don’t think he’s fit to lead our country
So let’s end the dither and delay. The 
deadlock and divisions.
And if we have a working majority, I 
pledge we will have a parliament that 
works for ou
That focuses on the NHS and cost of living
Because when we get Brexit done we will 
go forward as a strong and confident 
naon that has put our faith in the 







Linear argument  
Figure 1: Johnson’s linear argument vs May’s disordered one
Sources: Theresa May: ‘My plan for a stronger Britain’ and Boris Johnson: ‘Our choice is very
simple’12
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of discontent’) to the presence of socially
conservative cultural values, which, in turn,
correlate closely with support for Brexit.13
These studies show that towns and small
cities, particularly in postindustrial settings,
have struggled to carve out a position for
themselves in an economic model which
favours large urban areas embedded within
networks of commuter towns. Their local
economic development feeds into differences
of demographic profile. Young people and
graduates will be drawn to areas with a
greater range of economic opportunities.
Cities also combine this labour market ‘pull
effect’ with access to a host of cultural activi-
ties, which small towns are unable to match.
Commuter belts linked to big cities similarly
benefit from their proximity to these cultural
and economic opportunities. These trends
have created a cycle of uneven economic
development. This compounds the long-
term, historic tendency for London and the
South East to dominate the British econ-
omy.14
The existing scholarship has identified a
cultural backlash in disadvantaged towns
and small cities, which is associated with a
rise in anti-immigrant feeling, nativist politi-
cal sentiment and identity, and the internali-
sation of elite rhetoric and media frames in
light of depressed local economic circum-
stances.15 Accordingly, Brexit has been cast
as ‘a revenge of the places that don’t matter’,
not ‘the people that don’t matter’, because it
is often the relatively comfortable in areas
experiencing decline that have responded
most enthusiastically to its range of ideologi-
cal messages.16 Nonetheless, the spatial basis
of the Brexit vote is closely intertwined with
its demographics. The two most important
predictors of Brexit support—age and educa-
tional level—foster changes in the overall
profile of local areas. If a town or region has
reduced opportunities for graduates and
young people, they will see a drain of these
groups to other areas. Their destinations
then become centres of anti-Brexit conviction
with large levels of remain support.
These patterns can be seen clearly in the
fractured economic geographies, which Boris
Johnson capitalised on to win his landslide
general election victory. We compiled data
on a range of demographic and economic
measurements for four groups of seats: seats
















rank out of 533, where 1
is most deprived)
108 233 133 375
% Outright ownership
(mean)
25% 30% 32% 35%
% Private renters (mean) 19% 20% 13% 14%
% Social housing (mean) 24% 17% 20% 13%
% Ownership with mort-
gage (mean)
30% 32% 34% 35%
Median house price £160,000 £200,000 £143,000 £265,000
Median weekly wage £550 £580 £520 £600
% working age popula-
tion (mean)
63% 62% 59% 58%
% Pensioners (mean) 15% 17% 20% 21%
% White (mean) 76% 86% 92% 93%
% Graduates (mean) 26% 31% 20% 28%
Source: Compiled by authors from House of Commons Library and Office for National Statistics.
*Labour ‘gains’ in 2017 or 2019 include seats won in 2017 that were lost again in 2019. The Conservative
‘gains’ from 2017 or 2019 exclude those lost in 2017 and won back in 2019.
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held by Labour and the Conservatives in
2015, 2017 and 2019 (‘Labour consistently
held’, ‘Conservative consistently held’); those
gained by the Conservatives from Labour in
2017 or 2019; and those gained by Labour in
2017 or 2019 (see Table 4). While the category
of ‘Labour gain’ includes seats that were won
in 2017 only to be lost again in 2019 (and the
category of ‘Conservative gain’ does not
include these seats), the figures nonetheless
give an indication of how the political divides
of England and Wales map onto different
socioeconomic and demographical profiles.
Our findings illustrate clear patterns in relation
to all seats, but especially the ‘Conservative
gains’. Conservative gains from Labour in
2017 and 2019 tend to have:
• high rates of deprivation, but not as high
as consistently held Labour seats;
• above average rates of home ownership,
but low house prices;
• relatively high pensioner population and
relatively low numbers of graduates;
• much higher levels of social housing than
traditional Conservative seats;
• low levels of ethnic diversity, almost identi-
cal to the consistently held Conservative
seats;
• the lowest median wage of all four seats
in our analysis.
House prices are a proxy for the extent of
the demand for homes in a particular location,
so a low level indicates depressed levels of cul-
tural and economic capital. Indeed, this is
borne out by analysis of per capita GDP data.
Although this is not available on a con-
stituency level, taking the local authority dis-
trict data and weighting by population size
gives an average GDP per capita in ‘Conserva-
tive gain’ seats of £23,055 in 2018—nearly a
third lower than the £32,090 found in consis-
tently held Conservative seats (authors’ analy-
sis of Office for National Statistics data).
Similarly, the strikingly low wages available
in these former ‘red wall’ seats implies the
over-representation of a group of voters which
has long been of interest to the major parties.
From Ed Miliband’s ‘the squeezed middle’, to
George Osborne’s ‘hard working families’ and
Theresa May’s ‘just about managing’, the mid-
dle of the road, below median income voter
has for some time fascinated Britain’s political
elite. Boris Johnson’s argumentation in the
general election departed from these labels,
however, through its embrace of place over per-
son. He directly addressed the real economic
need to ‘level up’ these discontented economic
geographies with a ‘tidal wave of investment’,
cleverly linking this to the need to draw a line
under Brexit by nominally completing the pro-
cess of leaving the EU with his exit agreement.
We believe this shift is important. Whereas the
three other descriptions could all be inter-
preted as an elite talking down to voters, local
people are likely to take pride in their towns
and want them to be given a greater chance to
succeed economically.
Johnson rendered politically salient an anal-
ysis of the disadvantaged localities of England
and Wales that has been observed and mea-
sured in the academic scholarship. Qualitative
analysis has also found residents in these
areas tend to internalise wider media dis-
courses around the ‘left behind’.17 An identity
of being part of a left-behind community can
form as a result. Johnson’s messaging was
highly attuned to these ‘common sense’ regis-
ters that form in such communities. He now
faces a challenge of keeping together an elec-
toral coalition comprised of voters who have
potentially divergent economic interests: a tra-
ditional Conservative vote concerned with
lower taxes and maintaining existing pockets
of economic affluence, and a ‘new’ layer of
communities demanding that the Johnson
government fulfil its electoral promises.
An analysis of geography has to be inte-
grated, however, with a recognition of the
stark demographic differences in the Conser-
vative vote. For every over sixty-five year-
old voter who backed Labour in the general
election, for example, more than three voted
Conservative.18 In addition, even small
swings in certain demographic groups can
be highly significant in a first past the past
system, depending on how they are spread
across constituencies.
Reviewing British Election Study data
across these four different categories of seats
in England and Wales illustrates this.19 We
find a significantly stronger level of support
for leaving the EU in the ‘Conservative gain’
seat category (see Figure 2). Similarly, the
Labour gain seat category is distinctive as
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being the only one with a leave minority.
Notably, a clear majority for leave also exists
in the affluent, consistently held Conserva-
tive seats in our analysis. This provides an
important caveat of the ‘geographies of dis-
content’ analysis, which serves as a reminder
that Brexit represented an economically and
geographically diverse coalition united
around a populist message.
However, when we turn to cultural and
economic values, a more even picture exists
across all four categories of seat (see Fig-
ure 3). The British Election Study distin-
guishes between left/right views and
authoritarian/socially liberal ones. The for-
mer are defined by four attitudinal measures
including ‘there is one rule for the rich,
another for the poor’ and ‘there is no need
for strong trade unions to protect workers
rights’. The authoritarian/socially liberal
cleavage is defined by five prompts includ-
ing ‘for some crimes the death penalty is the
most appropriate sentence’ and ‘young peo-
ple don’t have enough respect for traditional
values’. A score of one to ten is generated
where ten is the most authoritarian or most
right-wing, respectively. As Figure 3 shows,
there is little difference in the average score
Figure 2: Strength of 2016 leave vote by constituency group
Source: British Election Study. Original question: ‘In the referendum in 2016 on whether Bri-
tain should remain in or leave the European Union, which way did you vote, or did you not
vote?’
Figure 3: Average authoritarian/socially liberal score and average left/right score for respon-
dents in each category of seat.
Source: British Election Study.
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across the four categories of constituencies
we have analysed. The data underline how,
in attitudinal terms, the average voter in
England and Wales is fairly socially conser-
vative and fairly left-wing.
Importantly, these are average scores across
each category of constituency. They do not
refute the wider evidence we have regarding
the demographic profiles of Brexit and Remain
voters per se. Indeed, it is easy to assume that
because a constituency has relatively fewer
graduates it has no graduates, whereas in real-
ity, our Conservative gain seat category still
has an average graduate population of 20 per
cent. A similar error can occur in relation to
the Brexit vote itself. An area that voted heav-
ily to remain in the EU will still have a small
and possibly vocal level of Brexit support.
Moreover, while the average leave voter is
more ‘right-wing, authoritarian, ethnocentric,
populist . . . and less tolerant’ than the average
remain voter, this can disguise variation on
both sides, as well as the mutability and com-
plexity of attitudes.20
In this sense, Johnson’s strategy in the
election was carefully calibrated to a small
but electorally significant group of potential
swing voters within the former ‘red wall’
seats—rather than the ‘totality’ of the elec-
torate. His messaging resonated with the
economic geographies of these areas and
built on their strong levels of Brexit support.
Unlike Theresa May’s campaign, he pre-
sented a clear and easily comprehended case
for voting Conservative that optimised his
success of striking a deal with the EU.
Conclusion
Viewed in retrospect, it is easy to read the
course of historical events as inevitable. This
is, of course, not the case. Nonetheless, the
sociological and cultural base for a greatly
expanded Conservative electoral coalition was
put in place by the 2016 Brexit referendum.
The polarisation it produced between leavers
and remainers was distributed geographically
across constituencies in a manner that
favoured a Conservative side which champi-
oned Brexit. One 2019 counter-factual possibil-
ity that might be plausible could, however,
run as follows. If Labour had changed its lea-
der after the European elections (and in
parallel to the Conservative leadership con-
test) to someone with greater public favoura-
bility, it would have removed what was for
many a big barrier to voting Labour. If the
new leader enjoyed a honeymoon in support,
they may have had the confidence to push
Johnson into a September election that forced
the Conservatives to run on a platform of ‘no
deal’, a position which lacked majority sup-
port. Conservative remainers may have felt
more comfortable voting Liberal Democrat in
Labour–Tory marginals if they had more con-
fidence in the Labour leadership. But few in
Labour politics countenanced a leadership
challenge to Corbyn. Fewer still were willing
to take up the challenge of a September 2019
general election. A second referendum would
always have been a tough sell in the leave vot-
ing seats, but may have had some resonance if
it was presented as the alternative to a no-deal
exit from the EU. But even in these circum-
stances, defeating Johnson would have been a
formidable challenge.
Looking forward, however, the Conserva-
tive vote is potentially fragile. The ‘median
voter’ has attitudinal views well to the left of
traditional Conservative politics. Delivering
Brexit will not have the same partisan appeal
at the next general election. These factors
could have both proven decisive prior to the
economic collapse brought about by the
coronavirus pandemic. In this context, the
Conservatives will struggle to deliver the big
promise of ‘levelling up’ they made to the
voters of the red wall.
A future Labour campaign confronting
these likely failures could do worse than learn
from the clarity of messaging and argumenta-
tion that Johnson achieved in 2019. There was
no ambiguity about his goals. The voter was
left with a clear understanding of what he
wanted to achieve and how this related to his
underlying values. He took a decisive position
on a polarising issue, made a persistent case
and capitalised on his opponents’ divisions
and weakness. These seem like important
ingredients for effective political communica-
tion and electoral success.
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